Home Savings and Loan, a Utah Corporation v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1991
Home Savings and Loan, a Utah Corporation v.
The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company : Brief in
Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Lynn S. Davies; Russell C. Fericks; Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nelson; Attorneys for Appellant;
Thomas A. Doyle; Baker & McKenzie.
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker; Gary R. Howe; P. Bryan Fishburn; Scott A. Call; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, Home Savings and Loan v. The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, No. 910436.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3684
'T \
x;n?i (/
, -^
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH
HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Appeal from Utah Court
of Appeals' Decision
Dated August 6, 1991
(Case No. 890101-CA)
vs.
THE AETNA CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellant.
Case No. 910436
APPELLEE'S BRIEF OPPOSING AETNA'S
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
GARY R. HOWE (#A1552)
P. BRYAN FISHBURN (#A4572)
SCOTT A. CALL (#A0544)
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appe
Home Savings & Loan Associat
800 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
LYNN S. DAVIES (#A0824)
RUSSELL C. FERICKS (#A3793)
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant,
The Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
50 South Main Street
Key Bank Tower, Suite #700
Post Office Box 2465
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110
Telephone: (801) 531-1777
THOMAS A. DOYLE, ESQ.
BAKER & MCKENZIE
Drive130 East Randolph
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Telephone: (312) 861-8866
;w 6
llee
ion
CLERK oUHHf:
1/iAf
iv^U'.:1
IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF UTAH
HOME SAVINGS AND LOAN, a
Utah corporation,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Appeal from Utah Court
of Appeals* Decision
Dated August 6, 1991
(Case No. 890101-CA)
vs.
THE AETNA CASUALTY AND
SURETY COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellant.
Case No. 910436
APPELLEE'S BRIEF OPPOSING AETNA'S
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
GARY R. HOWE (#A1552)
P. BRYAN FISHBURN (#A4572)
SCOTT A. CALL (#A0544)
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellee
Home Savings & Loan Association
800 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133
Telephone: (801) 530-7300
DAVIES (#A0824)
C. FERICKS (#A3793)
, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
s for Defendant/Appellant,
a Casualty & Surety Co.
Main Street
Tower, Suite #700
ice Box 2465
e City, Utah 84110
e: (801) 531-1777
LYNN S.
RUSSELL
RICHARDS
Attorney
The Aetn
5 0 South
Key Bank
Post Off
Salt Lak
Telephon
thomas a. doyle, esq.
baker & Mckenzie
130 East Randolph Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Telephone: (312) 861-8866
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES i
PARTIES 1
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 1
JURISDICTION 2
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2
I. Nature of the Case 2
II. Procedural History and Trial Court Disposition 3
III. Statement of Facts 4
IV. Governing; Contract Provisions 7
ARGUMENT 8
I. Aetna fails to establish any "special or important"
reason why the Supreme Court should re-examine the
Court of Appeals ' holding regarding coverage 8
A. This issue is extremely unlikely to be presented
in subsequent litigation 10
B. The dire consequences that Aetna predicts as a
consequence of the the Court of Appeals' Decision
are illusory 11
C. The Court of Appeals' holding on coverage is
properly based on the bond's insuring agreements. . 13
D. The Alcorn complaint did not warrant entry of summary
judgment in Aetna 's favor 17
II. Aetna does not establish sufficient reason for the
Supreme Court to re-examine the Court of Appeals'
construction of Section 11 18
CONCLUSION 2 0
CASES:
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
American Empire Ins. Co. of So. Dakota v. Fidelity &
Deposit Co. of Md., 408 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert, denied 24 L.Ed. 2d 69 (1969) 14
C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Co. of No.
America, 590 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir.), cert, denied
444 U.S. 831, 100 S. Ct. 59 19
Continental Cas. Co. v. First National Bank of Temple.
116 F.2d 885 (5th Cir.), cert, denied
85 L.Ed. 1533 (1941) 14
Continental Ins. Co. v. Morgan, Olmstead, Kennedy
& Gardner, 148 Cal. Rptr. 57, 66 (Cal. App. 1978) .... 13, 17
First Security Bank of Utah v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
Civil No. NC-74-23W (Memorandum Decis. and Order,
July 11, 1984) (Winder, J.) 16
LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857
(Utah 1988) 17
Mount Vernon Bank & Trust Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co..
224 F.Supp. 666 (E.D. Va. 1963) 16
Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
426 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970) 19
Royal Trust Bank v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, 788 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1986) 11, 15
St. Joe Paper Co. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co.,
359 F.2d 579, (5th Cir. 1966), cert, denied
19 L.Ed 2d 86 (1967); cases discussed at
Ct. App. Decis., p. 9 19
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Empire State Bank.
448 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1971) 12
Verneco, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,
219 So.2d 508 (La. 1969) 19
TREATISES:
13 Couch on Insurance §46:219 (1982) 14
ii
ARTICLES:
Harvey C. Koch, "Overview of Major Developments and Changes
During the Last Decade in Financial Institution Bonds,"
Financial Institution Bonds (ABA, Tort & Insurance Practice
Section; Eds. Koch & Rouse; 1989) (Symposium, Washington,
D.C., April 17-18, 1989)
Wildau, K. "Evolving Law of Third-Party Claims Under
Fidelity Bonds: When is Third-Party Recovery Allowed?"
Tort & Insurance Law J. (Fall 1989) 15
in
PARTIES
On Appellee's motion, the Court of Appeals on December 4,
1990 ordered that the Resolution Trust Corporation, as
conservator of newly chartered Home Savings Bank, F.S.B., be
substituted as Appellee in place of Home Savings & Loan. Utah R,
App. P. 38(b). For reasons of consistency, Appellee will be
referred to in this Brief as "Home"; as does Aetna in its
Petition and as the Court of Appeals did in its Decision.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The two issues as to which Aetna seeks certiorari may be
framed as follows:
1. Does the definition of "discovery," as set forth in a
"notice" rider to a now outdated bond form, warrant
re-examination by the Supreme Court of the issue of "coverage";
where the Court of Appeals' holding is based on language in the
"preamble" of the Aetna Bond, which no longer appears in the
standard bond now used by the surety industry for financial
institutions?
2. Under the facts of this case, does Aetna establish
sufficient basis for the Supreme Court to exercise its
supervisory power to re-examine the Court of Appeals' and Trial
Court's construction of Section 11 of Aetna's bond?
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals, on August 6, 1991, affirmed the
Judgment entered November 2, 1988 in Home's favor.
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider Aetna's
petition. Utah Code Ann.§ 78-2-2(5)(1953)(as amended 1989, Supp.
1991). Home's Brief opposing Aetna's petition is timely filed,
within an extension of time granted by the Supreme Court.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
As Aetna concedes, "No provisions of the Utah Constitution,
Utah Code Annotated, or other regulations are determinative of
the issues in this case."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I. Nature of the Case.
Home seeks indemnification for losses caused by the
dishonest conduct of one of its employees, Larry Glad, which it
sustained and discovered during the period a Savings & Loan
Blanket Bond issued by Aetna was in effect. Home's losses arose
when the United States District Court, D. Utah, in Armitage v.
Home Savings & Loan, Civil No. C82-0670K (Kane, J.) voided the
notes and trust deeds of 36 husband and wife borrowers who had
borrowed from Home to invest in AFCO, a Utah corporate enterprise
headed by Grant Affleck. The Armitage jury returned a verdict
adverse to Home on August 14, 1984. Following the jury's
verdict,, Home wrote off the loans in the latter part of 1984.
(Trial Exh. 220). Subsequently, the Armitage Court, on February
24, 1986, entered judgment formally voiding the borrowers' notes
and trust deeds. The principal on the 36 notes voided by the
Armitage Court totaled approximately $1.2 million, which resulted
in a net loss to Home of approximately $998,000.
II- Procedural History and Trial Court Disposition.
This action was tried to a jury over a five-week period in
October - November 1987. The Trial Court (Hon. Michael R.
Murphy) entered judgment in Home's favor on November 2, 1988.
Prior to trial, Aetna moved for summary judgment, contending
that judgment should be entered in Aetna's favor because Home,
allegedly, had "discovered its loss" before the Aetna Bond went
into effect on June 21, 1982 (though the Armitage verdict was not
returned until more than two years later, and judgment formally
entered eighteen months after that). Simultaneously, Home sought
a determination that, consistent with the bond's insuring
agreements, Home both "sustained" and thus "discovered" its loss
on the AFCO-investor loans during the time the Aetna Bond was in
effect. The Trial Court denied Aetna's motion for summary
judgment and issued a separate Order construing the Bond, in
which it ruled:
that plaintiff sustained a "loss," as the term "loss"
is contemplated in the Aetna Bond, on August 14, 1984.
Accordingly, plaintiff discovered its "loss sustained"
during the period the Aetna bond was in effect.
Sept. 21, 1987 Order (R. 385) (copy attached at Appendix, Tab 1) ;
see Ct. App. Decis., p. 6.
At trial, Aetna asserted: that Home had not proven that Glad
was dishonest; that Home's losses were caused by Home's
mismanagement, not by Glad; that Home had failed to timely notify
Aetna of a covered loss or potential loss; that Section 11
excluded coverage; and that its Bond was void ab initio because
of failure to disclose information material to the risk being
insured. Because Aetna failed to prove any prejudice, the Trial
Court disposed of Aetna's "timely notice" defense in instructing
the jury. Aetna, as the Court of Appeals noted, did not appeal
the Trial Court's ruling on "notice." Ct. App. Decis., p. 17.
The jury found that Glad's conduct was dishonest; and that Glad's
conduct caused Home's losses in connection with 34 of the 36
loans that the jury reviewed. The jury also found that Home did
not learn of Glad's dishonest conduct in connection with the
AFCO-investor loans until after the effective of the Aetna Bond.
Following trial, Aetna filed a JNOV motion in which it
contended, in contrast to the position it now takes in its
Petition, that the evidence at trial did not establish that Glad
was dishonest; or that Glad's misconduct caused Home's losses.
The Court denied Aetna's motion. Judge Murphy also rejected
Aetna's "Section 11" defense, in considering the jury's responses
to special interrogatories. Additional hearings ensued, which
involved matters extraneous to Aetna's present Petition.
Judgment was entered November 2, 1988.
Aetna appealed, asserting nine grounds alleged to constitute
error. The parties filed extensive briefs and the issues were
argued in November, 1990. On August 21, 1991, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the judgment. Judge Greenwood wrote for the
majority, joined by Judge Billings. Judge Bench dissented.
III- Statement of Facts.
Home highlights the following distinctions to the "Statement
of Facts" in Aetna's Petition.1
1 A more detailed exposition of pertinent facts may be
found in Home's Statement of Facts in its Brief to the Court
of Appeals, at pp. 10-26. See Tab 2, hereto.
1. Aetna issued a then standard Form 22 Savings & Loan
Blanket Bond to Home, effective June 21, 1982. Prior coverage
was through F&D of Maryland. Ct. App. Decis., p.4.
2. Aetna solicited Home's business, not vice versa. Ct.
App. Decis., p. 4 & 30 n. 23.
3. Initially, Home applied for the same amount of coverage
it had with F&D. Federal examiners, during the course of a
routine examination, directed Home to increase its coverage from
$900,000 to $1,135,000, consistent with regulatory formulas.
Appellee's Brief to Ct. Appeals, p. 11.
4. Alcorn v. Affleck was filed in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in
April 1982 by several hundred disgruntled AFCO investors against
68 named defendants, including Home and 16 other financial
institutions. Aetna's Statement omits that:
a. The Alcorn complaint (Trial Exh. 358) asserted
causes of action common to all 17 financial institutions and
was not directed exclusively to Home or its employees.
b. The Complaint did not allege that any of Home's
employees had engaged in any specific dishonest conduct;
though it did assert a fraud claim (as well as 22 other
causes of action) common to the 68 defendants.
c. Notwithstanding the Alcorn complaint, Home
believed that its trust deeds were enforceable because it
had prepared a document for each borrower to sign,
acknowledging his/her sole responsibility to repay his/her
note. See Ct. App. Decis., p. 3.
d. Aetna did not ask Home to disclose pending
lawsuits in the application it instructed Home to complete.
Ct. App. Decis., p. 28 & 30, n. 25.
e. After Home in December, 1982 notified Aetna of a
potential loss possibly covered by the bond, Aetna retained
Suitter & Axland to monitor the Armitage litigation, to
review pleadings, sit in on depositions, etc. (Pre-Trial
Order, R. 726). On September 30, 1983, having had the
benefit of monitoring the Armitage lawsuit and having
reviewed the very same pre-June 21, 1982 pleadings that it
now emphasizes in its Petition, Aetna advised Home in
writing that the pleadings did not set forth any claims that
would be covered under its Bond and opted not to defend
Home. See Ct. App. Decis., p. 22 n. 15; Trial Exh. 140.
5. As Aetna states, Home, prior to June 21, 1982, had
learned of a dishonest act by employee Larry Glad. Aetna fails
to mention, however, that the jury found that the dishonest act
about which Home had learned was "not related to the AFCO
investor loans," Jury Ans. to Special Interrog. No. 7; and that
Home immediately terminated Glad after it learned of that
particular dishonest act. See Ct. App. Decis., p. 2-3.
6. The jury concluded that any failure by Home to disclose
material information in connection with the application for
insurance it completed was not intentional. Jury Ans. to Special
Interrogatories Nos. 1-4; Ct. App. Decis., p. 6, 27.2
7. Contrary to the innuendo in Aetna's petition, Home has
always maintained that it discovered Larry Glad's dishonest
2 Aetna does not seek review of the Court of Appeals'
rejection of its misrepresentation defense. See Ct. App.
Decis., p. 26-30.
conduct, vis-a-vis the AFCO-investor loans, in the Fall of 1982,
in the course of discovery in Armitage and, thus, after Aetna's
bond went into effect in June, 1982. See Appellee's Brief to Ct.
Appeals, p. 26. The jury agreed, finding that Home did not learn
of dishonest conduct by Glad in connection with the AFCO-investor
loans prior to June 21, 1982. Jury Ans. to Spec. Interrog. No.
7; Ct. App. Decis., p. 6, 17.
IV. Governing Contract Provisions.
The Bond at issue is now an outdated Standard Form No. 22
"Savings & Loan Blanket Bond" (1970 revised version), as amended
by the thirteen "riders" designated in the Bond's cover sheet ana
appended to the Bond. (Trial Exh. 343). Coverage for fidelity
losses is governed by the introductory paragraph of the insuring
agreements, which the Court of Appeals labeled "the Preamble,"
Ct. App. Decis., p. 15, and by Rider 6041. Section 11, paragraph
3, of the Bond terminates coverage as to a particular employee
once an employer learns of dishonest conduct by the employee.
Section 4 of the Bond defines the Insured's duty to provide
notice. Rider 6091 specifically amends Section 4, and clarifies
that the Insured is expected to give notice, not only once a
covered loss has been sustained, but also "when the Insured
becomes aware of facts which would cause a reasonable person to
assume that a loss covered by the bond . . . will be incurred
even though the exact amount . . . of loss may not be then
known." The Court of Appeals held that Rider 6091 governs only
the Insured's duty to provide timely notice and concluded that it
does not bear on whether a loss that results from dishonest
conduct is or is not covered by the Bond. Ct. App. Decis., p.i^-
26. According to the Court of Appeals, Rider 6091 does not
govern the outcome of any issues on appeal.
Furthermore, the form of bond which Aetna asks the Supreme
Court to again interpret is one that is no longer used by
sureties or financial institutions, having been displaced in 1986
by the significantly revised Form 24 "Financial Institution
Bond."3 In particular, the introductory insuring agreement
language (the "Preamble") found in the 1970 Form 22 S&L Aetna
Bond, on which the Court of Appeals and Trial Court based their
holding, does not appear in the new Financial Institution Bond.
ARGUMENT
I. Aetna fails to establish any "special or important" reason
why the Supreme Court should re-examine the Court of
Appeals' holding regarding coverage.
The first question presented by Aetna's Petition concerns
the scope of coverage provided by Aetna's promise to indemnify
Home for "loss sustained by the Insured at any time but
3 In 1986, the surety industry approved for use the
Form 24 Financial Institution Bond (Revised January, 1986).
The Financial Institution Bond displaces former versions of
the Form 24 Bankers Blanket Bond and the Form 22 S&L Blanket
Bond. Harvey C. Koch, "Overview of Major Developments and
Changes During the Last Decade in Financial Institution
Bonds," Financial Institution Bonds (ABA, Tort & Insurance
Practice Section; Eds. Koch & Rouse; 1989) (Symposium,
Washington, D.C., April 17-18, 1989) (attached at Tab 3). A
specimen of the standard Form 24 Financial Institution Bond
(revised to January, 1986) is attached hereto at Tab 4. The
Financial Institution Bond replaces the Form 22 S & L
Blanket Bond (as revised Dec. 1982), a specimen of which is
attached at Tab 5, which differs significantly from the 1970
version it replaced. Also attached for comparison purposes,
at Tab 6, is a specimen of the Form 24 Bankers Blanket Bond
(revised to July, 1980). At Tab 7 is a specimen of the Form
24 Bankers Blanket Bond (revised to April, 1969) (which is
similar to the Form 22 S&L Bond at issue). Home asks that
the Court take judicial notice of the different, standard
versions attached hereto.
discovered during the Bond Period." Aetna Bond, "Preamble" to
Insuring Agreements.4 Section 4 of the Aetna Bond provides that
written notice must be provided to Aetna "at the earliest
practicable moment after discovery of any loss hereunder ..."
Rider 6091 specifically amends Section 4, and provides that:
Discovery occurs when the Insured becomes aware of
facts which would cause a reasonable person to assume
that a loss covered by the bond has been or will be
incurred even though the exact amount or details of
loss may not be then known. Notice to the insured of
an actual or potential claim by a third party which
alleges that the Insured is liable under circumstances,
which, if true, would create a loss under this bond
constitutes such discovery.
The Court of Appeals concluded that this definition of discovery
in Rider 6091 applied only to the term "discovery" as used in the
Notice Provision and not to the term "discovery" as used in the
Preamble to the Insuring Agreements. The Court of Appeals relied
on several factors in this regard: (i) the phrase "discovered
during the Bond Period," as it appears in the Preamble, expressly
refers to "loss sustained," not dishonest employee conduct; (ii)
the above definition of discovery was added by an endorsement,
the stated purpose of which was to "amend" only the Notice
Provision (namely, Section 4 of the Bond); (iii) the Bond
includes a "Definitions" section that includes numerous
definitions that "apply throughout the bond" and Aetna did not
include the definition of "discovery" in the general Definitions
section; and (iv) different definitions of "discovery" for notice
4 In the entire breadth of its Petition, Aetna only
once mentions "the preamble" to its Bond (which governs
coverage generally) and never mentions Rider 6041 (the
fidelity insuring agreement). It is these express
provisions on which the Court of Appeals and the Trial Court
based their holdings. See Ct. App. Decis., p. 15-16.
purposes and coverage purposes "does not cause disharmony of the
bond language [given] the different purposes those provisions are
intended to serve." See Ct. App. Decis., p. 24-26.
This Court should decline to review the coverage issue for
several reasons. First, the coverage question is extremely
unlikely to recur in subsequent litigation, and is thus not a
"special and important" question worthy of discretionary review.
Second, the dire consequences predicted by Aetna are not likely
to occur. Third, the Court of Appeals correctly construed the
coverage provisions of the Bond. Finally, the Alcorn complaint
did not warrant entry of summary judgment in Aetna's favor.
A. This issue is extremely unlikely to be presented in
subsequent litigation.
The standard bond form at issue here was revised in 1982 to
move the contents of Rider 6091 into the body of the bond form.
That 1982 revision made three changes to the discovery definition
that are relevant to this Court's determination as to whether
this case warrants discretionary review. First, the Surety
Association of America, which issues the standard bond form,
removed the definition of discovery from the Notice Provision and
placed it in an entirely separate and independent section of the
bond. See Standard Form No. 22, Revised to December 1982,
Section 4 (attached hereto as Tab 5). Second, the Surety
Association added the following as the first sentence in the new
discovery provision: "This bond applies to loss discovered by
the Insured during the bond period." Third, the Surety
Association deleted the language in the Preamble to the Insuring
Clauses that had granted coverage for "loss sustained by the
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Insured at any time but discovered during the Bond Period."
Thus, the 1982 and subsequent changes wholly undermine
Aetna's suggestion that this case qualifies for discretionary
review. As previously stated, the question presented by the
language at issue here is extremely unlikely to recur since that
language was revised by the Surety Association, ostensibly to
resolve this ambiguity, almost ten years ago. Second, the Court
of Appeals indicated that it likely would agree with Aetna's
coverage position under the new bond language, even though it
rejected Aetna's coverage position under the prior ambiguous
language. See Ct. App. Decis. p. 23 ("This [new] language
clearly ties coverage to discovery of possible loss, because the
definition of discovery is given in the context of the bonds'
applicability, rather than in the context of notice
requirements").5
B. The dire consequences that Aetna predicts as a
consequence of the the Court of Appeals' Decision are
illusory.
Aetna vigorously complains that the decision of the Court of
Appeals will "uniquely prejudice Utah financial institutions and
their depositors," and will create "uncertainty and confusion"
for financial institutions in Utah. This complaint is totally
groundless. As a result of the 1982 and 1986 revisions to the
standard bond form, the decision of the Court of Appeals — even
if it is incorrect — will have no practical precedential impact
5 In discerning that two of the cases on which Aetna
relied in its Reply Brief contained operative provisions not
in and different from those in the Aetna Bond, the Court of
Appeals stated that, "Royal Trust and Clay are instructive
as to how Aetna might have drafted its bond to obtain the
result it now seeks."
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on current bond coverage issues in this state.
In addition to its "uncertainty and confusion" argument,
Aetna predicts that the Court of Appeals' holding will "encourage
financial institutions to postpone reporting losses in the hopes
of buying higher limits for known problems." This argument is
pure speculation, is contrary to the record, and of dubious
validity given the revisions in the standard bonds that have
transpired since the Aetna Bond was formulated in 1970. As a
practical matter, possibility always exists with a "discovery"
bond that an insured may be tempted to manipulate the claim.
Affirmative defenses to such errant conduct include fraud or
misrepresentation, or that the insured has not timely notified
its insurer of actual or potential loss. Neither issue is before
the Court. The Court of Appeals' Decision in no way increases
incentive to hide knowledge of past employee misconduct, in order
to obtain higher coverage. What it may do is encourage insurers
to ask about former employees in applications for fidelity bond
coverage, see U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Empire State Bank,
448 F.2d 360, 366 (8th Cir. 1971) (which implicitly made this
same, unheeded, recommendation 20 years ago); or ask insureds to
disclose all pending lawsuits in applications for bond coverage
(as Aetna now does), see Ct. App. Decis., p. 30 n. 24.
Aetna belatedly argues that the Court of Appeals' Decision
will leave Utah financial institutions without coverage, because
fidelity insurers will refuse to renew coverage once they receive
notice of potential loss. Aetna Petition, p. 14. As the Court
of Appeals noted at page 25 n. 17 of its Decision, Aetna never
raised this argument below and both the Court's Sept. 21, 1987
12
Order and the facts stipulated to in the Pre-trial Order
establish that Home's loss was sustained following the jury's
verdict in 1984, within the bond period, when it then became
evident that Home would not be able to rely on the notes and
trust deeds that it had presumed to be enforceable. This
particular argument, because it was never raised in the
approximately 5 year history of this case, has not been briefed
and should not be considered for the first time on appeal. If,
however, the express language in a bond is capable of being
interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the actual language
(Aetna's position); then the Insured is entitled to have the
ambiguity construed in favor of coverage. See Continental Ins.
Co. v. Morgan. Olmstead, Kennedy & Gardner. 148 Cal. Rptr. 57, 66
(Cal. App. 1978). Furthermore, the Court of Appeals'
construction was predicated on express language which appears in
the 1970 edition Form 22 Aetna S&L Blanket Bond, which is not
replicated in the new 1986 Financial Institution Bond or in the
immediately prior 1982 version of the Form 22 S&L Blanket Bond.
Hence, it is extremely unlikely that this case will produce the
adverse result that Aetna foretells. Finally, for an insurer to
require notice of potential loss, then suggest it would use that
notice as a basis to arbitrarily refuse renewal of a bond, raises
serious question concerning the insurer's implied covenant to
deal in good faith.
C. The Court of Appeals' holding on coverage is properly
based on the bond's insuring agreements.
The Court of Appeals properly began its analysis by
examining the express language of the bond. As noted above, the
13
preamble to the insuring agreements in Aetna's bond states that
Aetna will "indemnify" "loss sustained by the Insured at any time
but discovered during the Bond period ..." Historically,
because a fidelity bond is an "indemnity insurance contract,"
courts have held that "the insurer's liability does not arise
until the insured has suffered a proven loss." American Empire
Ins. Co. of So. Dakota v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md.. 408 F.2d
72, 77 (5th Cir. 1969); 13 Couch on Insurance § 46:219 at 163
(1982). To successfully claim under a fidelity bond, an insured
must first prove it has sustained an actual loss; i.e., one
involving some sort of financial detriment. Continental Cas. Co.
v. First National Bank of Temple. 116 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir.),
cert, denied 85 L.Ed. 1533 (1941).
The Preamble, as the Court of Appeals held, requires Aetna
to indemnify loss sustained at any time, but discovered during
the bond period. Ct. App. Decis., p. 23-26. As the Trial Court
noted, in the usual fidelity loss context, the insured first
sustains a loss (e.g., through embezzlement), then later
ascertains that the loss was caused by employee dishonesty. In
that situation, fidelity insurers freely agree to indemnify
actual loss incurred even during an earlier bond period, provided
the insured doesn't learn that the earlier loss was the product
of employee dishonesty until such time as the second bond is in
place.
This case addresses the more infrequent situation where the
insurer alleges that the insured discovered dishonest conduct
during a prior bond period, but the loss is not actually
sustained or discovered until later. Based on tne express
14
language of the Preamble in the Aetna Bond, the Court of Appeals
and Trial Court both rejected Aetna's assertion that Home's loss
(which had not yet been incurred) was somehow "discovered" during
and covered by an earlier bond.
As Aetna explained its position to the Court of Appeals,
"Loss refers to the awareness of conditions out of which a claim
may arise, not to the insured's adjudicated liability for that
loss." It is this metaphysical definition of "loss" and
accompanying definition of "discovery of loss," that the Court of
Appeals rejected. The Court of Appeals exercised great care to
distinguish the cases collected by Aetna, virtually all of which
focused on the issue of whether an insured had timely given
notice to the insurer of a pre-existing loss or future loss,
believed to be covered by the bond. Ct. App. Decis., p. 17-24.6
The expectation that an insured should give notice as early
as possible, even before loss is actually sustained, has long
been recognized.7 Prior to 1980, the duty to give notice,
however, was not clearly specified in the Form 22 Bond. In the
case of the standard Form 22 S&L Blanket Bond, for example, the
6 Aetna especially criticizes the Court's distinction
of Royal Trust Bank v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh. 788 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1986). Petition, p. 13
n. 6. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the
operative language of the bond interpreted in Royal Trust
(which appears to have been a Form 24 Banker's Blanket Bond,
1980 revised ed.), differs markedly from that in the Form 22
S&L Bond (1970 revised ed.) with attached riders, which it
construed. Ct. App. Dec, p. 23 & n. 16; compare Aetna Bond
to bond construed in Royal Trust, supra at 720.
7 Wildau, K. "Evolving Law of Third-Party Claims Under
Fidelity Bonds: When is Third-Party Recovery Allowed?" Tort
& Insurance Law J. (Fall 1989), at 92, 113.
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duty of an insured to give notice, prior to 19808 was defined
solely by Section 4, which directed that:
At the earliest practicable moment after discovery of
any loss hereunder the Insured shall give the
Underwriter notice thereof . . .
Courts disagreed whether Section 4's "discovery of loss"
language required notice prior to the time the insured sustained
an actual loss covered by the Bond. Compare. Mount Vernon Bank
& Trust Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 224 F.Supp. 666 (E.D. Va.
1963) (requiring notice prior to realization of loss) and First
Security Bank of Utah v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., Civil No. NC-74-
23W (Memorandum Decis. and Order, July 11, 1984)(Winder, J.)
(holding that insured's duty to give notice in a third-party
claim context arises only once the third-party claim causes loss
to the insured).9 Rider 6091, which expressly amended Section 4,
was intended simply to clarify that insurers also wished notice
when "The Insured becomes aware of facts which would cause a
reasonable person to assume that a loss covered by the bond has
been or will be incurred ..." (Emphasis added).
Finally, Utah law is well settled that if coverage
provisions in a policy of insurance are ambiguous (as they would
seem to be when an insurer insists that an insuring agreement
means something other than what it says), then the insured is
entitled to have the ambiguity construed in favor of coverage.
R Rider 6091, for attachment to Standard Forms nos. 5,
14, 20, and 22, was adopted effective December, 1980. See
Aetna Bond, Rider 6091.
9 A copy of Judge Winder's Decision is attached hereto
at Tab 8. Contrary to the implicit threat in Aetna's
current Petition, Aetna did not refuse to insure financial
institutions in Utah following Judge Winder's Opinion.
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LPS Hospital v. Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858-59 (Utah
1988); see also Continental Ins. Co. v. Morgan, Olmstead, supra
at 66.
D. The Alcorn complaint did not warrant entry of summary
judgment in Aetna's favor.
In its summary judgment motion, Aetna relied on various
alleged events, which it argued would prompt any reasonable
person, prior to June 21, 1982, to conclude that a loss covered
by its Bond would be sustained. Secondarily, it relied on notice
ostensibly provided by the Alcorn complaint and one or two other
similar actions. The jury's finding that Glad's dishonest
conduct which Home discovered prior to June 1982 was not related
to the AFCO-investor loans, should preclude Aetna from rearguing
those facts yet again to this Court. Still, relying on Rider
6091, and interpreting Rider 6091 to define coverage, Aetna rails
that the Alcorn lawsuit (apparently apart from the jury's
finding) as a matter of law establishes coverage as falling
within the time period of the prior F&D Bond. As Aetna
characterizes the issue:
The Majority Opinion rejected Aetna's
reliance on a bright line test in a Rider to
the bond, which defines "discovery" in third-
party claim situations as occurring no later
than the date on which Home is sued by a
third-party alleging any employee dishonesty.
(Aetna Petition, p. 3).
Assuming arguendo that Rider 6091 redefines the Bond's insuring
provisions, Aetna conveniently forgets that on September 30,
1983, after studying the Alcorn and other complaints, it advised
Home that the pleadings did not assert any causes of action that,
if established, would be covered under the Bond. The Court of
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Appeals noted the inconsistency of Aetna's position, concluding
that, "In effect, Aetna asserted that Home had not discovered any
employee dishonesty at a time when the Aetna bond had been in
force for over one year." Ct. App. Decis., p. 22 n. 15. Having
itself concluded that the Alcorn complaint failed to state
allegations which, if true, would establish a loss under the
bond, Aetna cannot very well ask this Court to exercise its
supervisory/correction powers to now avoid the jury verdict and
judgment entered by the Trial Court and, instead, direct that
summary judgment be entered in Aetna's favor.
II. Aetna does not establish sufficient reason for the Supreme
Court to re-examine the Court of Appeals1 construction of
Section 11.
Section 11 of the Aetna Bond provides that when an insured
discovers that one of its employees has engaged in dishonest
conduct, the bond "shall be deemed terminated or canceled as to
[that] Employee." Its purpose is to shift the risk of loss
arising from future misconduct to the insured, once the insured
learns of dishonesty but nevertheless elects to retain the
employee. Ct. App. Decis., p. 9. In the context of the facts of
this case, the Court of Appeals, Decis., p. 14, held:
that coverage for losses caused by Glad's
dishonest conduct, where that conduct
occurred before Home learned that he was
dishonest, and where the coverage for such
losses would have continued under renewal of
the F&D bond, is not barred by section eleven
of the Aetna bond.
In asking this Court to exercise its supervisory function,
Aetna asserts that the Court of Appeals ignored "universal" and
"clear precedent" contrary to its decision. That "clear
precedent" consists of a single case,10 decided over a dissenting
opinion. In a detailed analysis, the Court of Appeals declined
to embrace the majority's holding in Wilson. The Court
distinguished most of the other cases Aetna again cites in its
Petition," noting that each involved the situation where an
employer hires an employee, knowing of past dishonest conduct;
and concluding that it is proper in such instance to deny
coverage for loss arising out of similar subsequent conduct. The
jury's finding that Home did not know of any dishonest conduct by
Glad prior to hiring him, however, renders these cases
inapposite. Jury Ans. to Spec. Interrog. No. 6.
Aetna argues in its Petition that Section 11 "properly
leaves" coverage with the insurer in whose bond period the
dishonesty was first discovered and that Home would have
perfected whatever coverage it had with F&D through timely
notice. First, this argument and explanation differs from the
interpretation Aetna initially requested below (which was that on
discovery of dishonest conduct all coverage for future losses is
terminated (even if F&D was still the insurer)). See Aetna's
Brief to Ct. Appeals, p. 31, 33. Second, it fails because the
dishonest conduct about which Home had learned prior to June 21,
1982 was, as the jury found, not related to the AFCO-investor
10 C. Douglas Wilson & Co. v. Insurance Co. of No.
America, 590 F.2d 1275 (4th Cir.), cert, denied, 444 U.S.
831, 100 S. Ct. 59.
11 Ritchie Grocer Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426
F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1970); Verneco, Inc. v. Fidelity & Cas
Co., 219 So.2d 508, (La. 1969); St. Joe Paper Co. v.
Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 359 F.2d 579, (5th Cir.
1966); cases discussed at Ct. App. Decis., p. 9.
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loans; thus notice to F&D of conduct that did not result in the
loss that Home later sustained would have perfected nothing.
Third, as the Court of Appeals held, Section 11 is ambiguous in
the situation where successive insurers are involved, and, for
the reasons explained by the Court, is "susceptible to the
interpretation that it does not bar the continuation of the same
fidelity loss coverage under the Aetna bond that existed under
the F&D bond." Ct. App. Decis., p. 14. The holding by the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the Trial Court's ruling below, is
based on a textual reading of Section 11 as well as consideration
of its purpose and objective, and relies on accepted rules of
construction where ambiguity exists. As such, this is not a
situation where supervisory correction, pursuant to Rule 46(c),
is warranted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above argument and authorities, Home requests
that the Supreme Court deny Aetna's petition for writ of
certiorari.
DATED this day of November, 1991.
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
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